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A person's increased willingness to be helpful after
he has transgressed against another is a strikingly con-
sistent observation recorded in many studies. The most
frequently cited explanation for this phenomenon is that
by helping, people are attempting to alleviate a feeling
of guilt which has been created in them by engaging in the
prior harmful behavior. This literature was reviewed, and
it was concluded that scant direct evidence exists in
support of this explanation. It was hypothesized that the
best single predictor for increased helpfulness after trans-
gression is whether or not the requested help would be
ameliorative of the harm previously done. An experiment
was conducted in which helping was either ameliorative or
not, and the actor's responsibility for the harm done was
either high or low (a 2 x 2 design)
.
Helping occurred more when the effects were ameliora-
tive of the harm done. While subjects' feelings of responsi
bility were successfully varied, feelings of guilt did not
reflect the same directional differences as would be pre-
dicted by a mediation by guilt explanation. Neither guilt
nor responsibi li ty affected helping . Implications for the
internal and ecological validities of transgression-com-
pliance research were discussed. Further research on these
and related questions was proposed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW
This thesis deals with an aspect of people's re-
actions to their own transgressions; specifically, their
subsequent compliance to requests for help. Interest in
the transgression-compliance phenomenon can be viewed as
a subset of a broader area of interest designated as pro-
social behavior in which the concern is to understand the
basic processes underlying social cohesion: cooperation,
helping in emergencies, altruistic practices and behavior,
sharing, and compliance to and with general norms and rules.
A large number of experimental studies of the trans-
gression-compliance phenomenon were based on the assumption
that the reduction of guilt is the central mediating
variable which determines the typically observed relation
between harming another and subsequently helping the victim
or some other person. However, recently this general hypo-
thesis has been modified by a number of limiting conditions,
experimentally derived. The present paper takes the position
that continued search for limiting conditions is an in-
adequate approach to the problem because the guilt hypo-
thesis and its attendant methodology in use are themselves
2inadequate to explain the transgression-compliance
phenomenon which is observed in the laboratory. The tacit
assumption of the guilt hypothesis is that people are
basically hedonistic and self-serving organisms. This
tacit assumption leads all too easily to the formulation
(which has been broadly generalized beyond the scope of the
research on which it is allegedly based) that people help
others in order to help themselves feel better, i.e., to
feel less or not gui 1 ty
.
This idea can be faulted on both conceptual and
methodological grounds. The thrust of the present argument
is that the assumption made about the presence of guilt in
the transgression-compliance s ituation imposed an un-
necessary limitation on the research conducted in support
of that assumption . The phenomenology of the actor was , as
a result, almost completely overlooked . In addition, a re-
vew of the relevant literature reveals evidence for at least
three variables which could account for a good deal of the
findings without reference to gui It feelings . If these
variables were to be added to the guilt hypothesis as limit-
ing conditions the result would be to lirilit it almost out
of the realm of meaningfulness . In this same literature, in
the rare occurrences when guilt was directly assessed, little
support for its existence was obtained. The experiment re-
3ported in this paper tested an hypothesis derived from
the literature review concerning the effects of the
ameliorative nature of the requested help on the amount
of help given by a transgressor. At the same time the
guilt hypothesis was directly tested.
The typical transgression-compliance experiment uses
a laboratory setting in which a subject is induced to "harm"
another person and then is observed in order to determine
the effects of harm-doing on the subject's subsequent help-
ing. Frequently, the initial harm-doing is an integral part
of some ostensible experimental procedure, as, for example,
when a subject is instructed to administer shock to another
for errors on a learning task. Sometimes a variant of this
is employed so that events are arranged in which subjects
believe they are the cause of accidental harm, for example,
as in the accidental destruction of a laboratory apparatus
.
Accidental harm-doing is also employed in the few field
studies conducted on this topic. Least often used is a
procedure which enables an experimental, sub j ect to cheat on
a paper-and-pencil test, the harm presumably being done to
the experimenter because of the importance of the test for
research purposes
.
Subsequent helping in the laboratory setting is almost
always presented to subjects as something they can do for
another which is not within the normal procedures of any
experiment. For example, they might be asked to partici-
pate in another study just as a favor to the experimenter
or to a friend of the experimenter. Or they might be asked
to volunteer time or money to a charitable or social in- I
terest organization. In the field studies involving
accidental harm-doing, they are exposed to a stranger in
mild distress, for example, a woman who drops a bag of
groceries
.
The results of these procedures have generally shown
that when an actor harms another he is more likely to com-
ply with a request for help (and in a few cases more likely
to help spontaneously) than if no harm is previously per-
petrated. But this general statement must be qualified
immediately. Not all combinations of the above operationali
zations of harm-doing and of helping will yield this effect.
To anticipate the literature analysis which follows, there
seem to be at least three additional factors which have an
influence on whether the transgression-compliance effect of
more helping is strongly produced: whether the harm done
is legitimate or illegitimate according to the situation in
which it occurs, whether the help will undo the harm that
was done, and who the requester of help is.
While the procedures used in these studies are thus
easily summarized , the explanations that have been proposed
for the observation that harming increases subsequent help-
ing are not. Yet this much can be said: concepts such as
guilt, embarrassment, self-esteem maintenance and social
consistency, as they have been applied to the transgression-
compliance phenomenon, all are explanations based on a model
using a single mediating factor. While the discussion below
will be directed mainly at the inadequacies of the guilt
explanation, the observations and conclusions arrived at
apply to each of these other explanatory concepts as well.
For a large majority of studies do not provide enough informa
tion about mediating events in order to make a decision in
favor of any one of them as a plausible explanation. Where
the pertinent data do exist, they support a different ex-
planation along cognitive, multi-factor lines.
Preliminary considerations . Brock (1969) focused on
transgression-compliance research which addressed itself to
the guilt hypothesis and reviewed that literature. He
concluded that a guilt explanation was premature at that
time because of the concept 1 s lack of precision , because
independent checks on the guilt manipulations were lacking
,
and because certain results did not fit derivations from a
gui 1 t explanation . He did not make clear how the last of
these conclusions could be supported in light of the first.
That is, precise derivations cannot be made (and hence
cannot be disconf irmed ) from a concept which lacks the
necessary precision in the first place. Nevertheless, his
6critique of the methodological errors is sound. With few
exceptions, publications since Brock's review suffer from the
same lack of manipulation checks which he noted.
Despite ambiguity over predictions in specific situ-
researcher in this area, Freedman,
what guilt in this context means and
be related to.
The notion that guilt will lead to pressures
toward expiation probably goes as far back as the
concept of guilt itself. Presumably when someone
feels that he has done something wrong there will
be a tendency for him to make up for his wrongful
deed. He can do this by subjecting himself to
punishment or by doing something good to balance
the bad. Either of these processes might lead to
increased compliance if the request is appropriate.
Given the opportunity to engage in some extremely
unpleasant behavior, the guilty person should be
more likely to agree than the nonguilty because the
former can view it as his good deed for the day
which will make up for the bad deed about which he
feels guilty. This line of reasoning leads to the
hypothesis that guilt will lead to greater compliance
in a wide variety of situations. (Freedman,
Wallington & Bless, 1967, p. 117.)
Although unattributed , the source of these ideas seems
clear, for the sense of the remarks indicates some sort of
ations, one prominent
is fairly clear about
what it is thought to
equilibrium model very similar to the Freudian position on
neurotic guilt (Freud, 1949). To paraphrase: harm doing
causes guilt, guilt feels bad and the person will soon do
something to feel better. Freedman 's formulation relies
on the Freudian-like concept of social man as a self-serving
organism. This position as expressed here (and Freedman 's
is the most concise statement of it in the transgression-
compliance literature), disregards the actor's relations
to others who might be significant in the situation, such
as the subject's partner or the experimenter. Not sur-
prisingly, the methods used to test the guilt hypothesis also
disregard the possibility that the typically used trans-
gression-compliance laboratory procedures might mean
something different to the participating subject. To anti-
cipate the review which follows, the subject may believe he
is merely following legitimate instructions and not really
harming anyone. The lack of manipulation checks in these
studies seems to result from the theoretical stance adopted
in them and not from a lack of methodological sophistication.
Experimental evidence (Weber & Cook, 1972) and
theoretical considerations from several sources (e.g.,
Alexander & Knight, 1971; Goffman, 1959; Harre & Secord,
1973) converge to suggest that the laboratory setting and
situations typically used in this research should be con-
sidered a dynamic social situation in which subjects do not
necessarily perceive the "stimulus situation" in the same
manner as does the experimenter. For example, the ex-
perimenter assumes that the subject must feel his harm-doing
is not excusable, but the subject may see it as excusable.
A further consideration, expanded upon by Harre & Secord,
8which motivated the following literature analysis is that
if subjects do perceive the situations (especially the
transgression procedures) differently from experimenter
expectations, their subsequent actions could have for them
a meaning very different from the one given it by the
experimenter
.
These ideas can be reformulated in the form of three
questions: 1) What evidence is there to support the claim
that what subjects believed they were doing was "trans-
gressing-feeling guilty-complying"? 2) What other con-
jectures about what they experienced can be made from the
results? 3) What other evidence can be gathered in support
of these conjectures?
But these questions form only part of the problem.
A further complication sets in when in these experimental
situations the person of the experimenter is more than just
the individual who sets up the conditions for the subjects.
When the experimenter is also involved directly as the one
transgressed against or the one subsequently helped, re-
sults must be interpreted in light of the evidence (e.g.,
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 196 9 ; Tedeschi , Schlenker & Bonoma
,
1971) that the intrusion of the person of the experimenter
is an independent factor in addition to any factor de-
liberately manipulated in the procedures
.
It is not being claimed here that the presence of the
experimenter is confounded with the effect of prior trans-
gression on subsequent helping; for if the experimenter
is present he is so in all conditions of a given study.
Rather, the point to be made concerns the elaboration of a
theory of transgression-compliance and the ecological
validity of the findings. Insofar as the presence of the
experimenter serves in all conditions to elevate the magni-
tude of compliance, it is important to understand by what
process (es) his presence has this effect. If this effect
could be achieved by any other person who, for the subject,
is an influential communicator of the norms of the situation,
then the theory which accounts for the transgression-com-
pliance effect should take this factor into account. If,
on the other hand, the effect of the presence of the ex-
perimenter is due only to the special experimenter-sub ject
interaction as a laboratory artifact, then the validity of
generalizing the laboratory findings to life situations is
put in doubt.
The task of the present review , then , is not only to
answer the above three questions but to do so while trying
to separate from other effects those effects possibly
caused by the involvement of the person of the experimenter.
It will be argued that such an analysis leads to a more
adequate explanation of the transgression-compliance phenom-
enon .
10
man-
preview. The five studies which provided reports of
ipulation checks will be discussed in greater detail below.
All experiments included in the present review are listed
in Table 1. Table 1 indicates for each experiment the
nature of the transgression manipulation used and the nature
of the dependent measure used to operationalize helping. The
procedures of those experiments which are without manipula-
tion checks (the first nine listed and the two field studies)
were described in a general way above (pp. 3-4), and little
space will be expended in further discussion of them.
(See Table 1 . )
Examination of Table 2 will reveal several other
things about these experiments. First, experiments listed
in Table 2 have been classified according to whether or not
the harm done was excusable or not. Two distinct features
of many of the transgression procedures may be expected to
have this effect. First, in a number of instances subjects
were performing actions which were ostensibly a normal part
of a legitimate experimental procedure
,
e.g., shocking a
learner for errors . Second , in other cases subjects were
involved in what must have been for them an unavoidable
accident . In these latter cases the experiments 1 procedures
require that no matter what a subject did, an "accident" be-
fell him.
Table 1
Transgression procedures and helping
measures for each study reviewed
Study Transgression
Brock & Becker
,
1966*
Wallace &
Sadalla, 1966*
Darlington &
Macker
,
1966*
Freedman,
Wallington &
Bless, 1967*
E's apparatus blows up
when touched by S
Apparatus blows up
S fails to win points
for a needy C, C wins
points for S
S lies to E, denies
knowledge of test
Helping
none
S volunteers
to participate
in more experi
ments, will re
ceive electric
shock
donate blood
volunteer for
more experi-
ments
Freedman, et a_l
1967*
S spills file cards
,
ruining them N for use
volunteer for
more experiments
Freedman
, et al
1967*
Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969*
Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969*
S spills file cards,
ruining them for use
teacher- learner situa
tion with simulated
shock
teacher -learner with
shock
volunteer for
more experiments
S agrees to
make phone calls
for a "Save the
Redwoods 1 '
campaign
"Save the
Redwoods"
McMillan, 1971 S lies to E, denies
knowledge of test
volunteer for
more experiments
11
t12
Study
Regan, J
.
,
1971
Cialdini
,
Darby
& Vincent, 1973
Table 1 (continued)
Transgression
E 1 s machinery fouls up
after S is induced by
C to handle it
teacher-learner with
shock
Geer & Jarmecky, teacher-learner with
1973 shock
Studies reporting manipulation checks
Helping
volunteer for
more experi-
ments
volunteer for
another experi-
ment for friend
of E
reaction time
in turning off
C's shock
Brock & Buss,
1964*
teacher-learner with
shock
none
Heilman, Hodgson
& Hornstein
1972
careless ruining of an
experiment
reporting the
accident , would
aid the victm
Katz , Glass &
Cohen, 1973
teacher-learner with
shock
none
Noel, 1973
Wallington, 1973
Konecni , 1972
Regan , Williams
& Sparling, 1972
S gives false negative
feedback to C
S lies to E , denies
knowledge of test
pedestrian accident
(field study)
(no manipulation check)
S "breaks" E 1 s camera
while taking his picture
(field study)
volunteer time
to a social
welfare program
none
pick up spilled
computer cards
pick up spilled
merchandise
Indicates a study reviewed by Brock , 1969
.
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Thus, in the former cases the apparent legitimacy of
their actions suggests that little or no guilt may have been
experienced by subjects. Indeed, in a great deal of research
on obedience to authority (Milgram, 1974), not a single
instance is reported in which "teaching" subjects expressed
a sense of guilt over shocking a confederate, even when the
confederate received shock which appeared to cause him great
harm. In the cases described above as accidental, subjects,
by definition, should not have perceived the effects of their
actions as intended by them; so again the experience of guilt
should be trivial, at best.
The procedures of each experiment have therefore been
classified in Table 2 as either legitimate or illegitimate
and as intended or unintended. Legitimacy and/or uninten-
tionally should result in subjects 1 actions being perceived
by themselves as excusable and therefore these procedures
should be considered unlikely to have adequately generated
significant guilt feelings. Since few of the experiments
report manipulation checks for guilt, it seems appropriate
to raise strong doubts as to the presence of the phenomenon
on this basis alone
.
In addition to the excusable or unexcusable nature of
the transgression procedures, three other factors appear to
run through the experiments in a somewhat systematic
fashion. These have also been indicated in Table 2. Some-
times the requested help will undo or partially undo the harm
that was just done by the subject. For example, a subject
who has just wrecked a graduate student's file card system
to be used in writing a dissertation is asked to volunteer
time in helping that same student. This factor is identified
as ameliorative (A) or not ameliorative (NA) helping. The
second factor is whether the person to be helped is the
victim of the original harm or a third party, independent of
whether the actual helping is ameliorative or not. In the
above example it could be that some other graduate student
needs volunteer time. This factor is identified as original
victim harmed (V) or a third party (3 P) . Finally, and
theoretically independent of the first two factors, is
whether the person making the request for help is the ex-
perimenter or someone who is associated with the experi-
menter 'on the one hand, or someone not related to the person
of the experimenter at all (E or NE)
.
A brief summary of the significance of these factors
as they influence the validity of the guilt mediation
hypothesis follows. Most important, it is proposed that the
ameliorative nature of the consequences of helping is the
most powerful determinant of the level of help offered by
a transgressing subject. Second, since the focus of the
guilt hypothesis is intrapersonal , the best test of it is
in conditions in which the third person, a stranger in most
cases, is helped. Only five experiments report results for
this type of condition; and in one of them helping was not
significantly different from the helping of subjects in a
non-transgression control group. Third, when the experi-
menter or a person associated with him makes the request,
something which occurs in over half the experiments, there
is a strong likelihood that this serves to elevate helping
overall. This must suggest concern over the ecological
validity of the findings, since the objective levels of
helping involved are relatively small. Indeed, actual
helping behavior, as opposed to intentions to help, is rare-
ly measured.
The dependent measures of each experiment have been
classified in Table 2 as to whether their operationali-
zation involved assessments of beliefs and attitudes
(e.g., derogation of self or victim), intention to help,
or actual helping behavior* As can be seen, only six of
the sixteen experiments listed actually used a behavioral
measure of subsequent helpfulness . Insofar as the
measures of intention obtained did not measure levels of
specificity with respect to target, time, situation, and
behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), the results of the
ten experiments which only obtained vague promises of
help should be given less weight than results based on
actual behavior. In general, intentions are not the same
as helpfulness. (See Table 2.)
Table 2
Summary of unanalyzed but possibly
significant factors for each study reviewed
Study
Nature of
Transgression
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Sadalla, 1966
illegitimate
unintentional
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V intention
Darlington &
Macker
, 1966
legitimate
unintentional
excusable
NA 3P NE intention
Freedman, illegitimate
Wallington & Bless, intentional
1967 not excusable
NA 3P intention
Freedman , et al
1967
illegitimate
unintentional
excusable
V intention
Freedman, et al
.
,
1967
illegitimate
unintentional
excusable
V intention
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Table 2 (continued)
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Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969
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intentional
excusable
NA V NE intention
Carlsmith &
Gross, 1969
legitimate
intentional
excusable
NA V NE intention
McMilTan, 1971 illegitimate
intentional
not excusable
V intention
Regan, J. , 1971 illegitimate
intentional
not excusable
V E behavior
Cialdini
,
Darby
& Vincent, 1973
legitimate
intentional
excusable
NA 3P intention
Geer & Jarmecky
,
1973
legitimate
intentional
excusable
V NE behavior
Brock & Buss
,
1964
legitimate
intentional
excusable
beliefs &
attitudes
Heilman
,
Hodgson
& Hornstein, 1972
illegitimate
unintentional
excusable
V behavior
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Katz
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Cohen, 1973
Noel, 1973
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intentional
excusable
legitimate
intentional
excusable
NA 3P NE
beliefs
& atti-
tudes
intention
Wallington
,
1973
Konecni, 1972
illegitimate
intentional
not excusable
illegitimate
unintentional
excusable
V NE
beliefs
& atti-
tudes
behavior
Regan , Williams
& Sparling, 1972
legitimate
unintentional
excusable
NA 3P NE behavior
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Table 3 is a 2 x 2 classification of experiments
which used some measure of helping (either intention or
behavior) as the main dependent variable. Procedures have
been classified according to whether the transgression could
plausibly be seen as excusable or unexcusable and whether
the subsequent helping measure involved ameliorative helping
or not. The remainder of this discussion will focus on the
entries in this table.
Where transgression procedures involve the subject
in unexcusable harm doing it would be expected that guilt
induction is strongest. Only three experiments fall into
this category and two of them used procedures in which
helping was ameliorative of the harm done, confounding the
hypothesized effects of guilt with those likely to be due
to amelioration. From this point of view, only the first
of three studies reported by Freedman, Wallington & Bless
(1967) appears to be a completely adequate test of the guilt
hypothesis. Of the twelve experiments which used trans-
gression procedures which involve excusable harm doing, six
used ameliorative helping procedures. Therefore, there
remains only the task of explaining why in five out of the
six remaining experiments in the excusable/not ameliorative
cell increased helping occurred after transgression as
compared with non-transgression or control groups. (See
Table 3.)
Table 3
Classification of experiments according
to whether transgression is excusable
or not excusable and helping is ameliorative
or not ameliorative
Helping
Transgression Ameliorative Not Ameliorative
Excusable
Wallace & Sadalla,
1 66
Freedman, Wallington
& Bless, '67;'
#2 & #3
Heilman, Hodgson
& Hornstein,
Geer & Jarmecky,
' 73
Konecni, '72
72
Darlington & Macker
' 66
Cialdini, Darby &
Vincent, '73
Carlsmith & Gross,
'69; #1 & #2
Noel, *73
Regan, Williams &
Sparling, '72
Not
Excusable McMillan, '71
Regan, '71
Freedman, Wallington
& Bless, 1 67; #1
20
Subjects in both the Darlington & Macker (1966) and
the Cialdini, Darby & Vincent (1973) studies were asked
to help by an associate of the experimenter. There is
evidence to justify concern over this observation which is
more specific to this paradigm than the general issue of the
enhancing effects of the person of the experimenter. In a
replication of the Freedman, et al. (1967) harm-doing by
lying study, Rivera, Silverman, Chilenski & Tedeschi (1976)
found that regardless of whether the subject had trans-
gressed or not, when asked to volunteer time for studies
in another department, those asked by the same experimenter
with whom they had interacted all along complied significant-
ly more than those who were asked by an "emergency sub-
stitute" experimenter who entered immediately prior to the
request. The fact that the experiments were unassociated
with the subject's present one presumably eliminated the
ameliorative nature of the help. The measure of compliance
was their stated intention to participate in another study.
Those authors interpreted the results in terms of the
subjects' attempts to manage a favorable impression of them-
selves before the experimenter who was more significant to
them; but this need not concern the present discussion. The
point is that in a typical guilt-compliance setting, the
presence of the person of the experimenter seems to be enough
to produce a compliance effect, for this main effect for
experimenter was independent of whether the subject had
transgressed or not. The lie-no lie conditions did not
produce a significant difference in degree of compliance.
As for the remaining experiments in the upper-right
cell, subjects in both experiments by Carlsmith & Gross
(1969) aided their original victims and so even though the
help was not objectively ameliorative, subjects could have
still perceived it as such.
From a total of nineteen experiments, the results of
which are commonly taken as support for the guilt mediation
explanation of the transgression-compliance phenomenon, only
two (Freedman et al.
, 1967; Regan, Williams & Sparling,
1972) appear to be reasonably exact tests of the concept;
and neither of these report results of manipulation checks.
With regard to the infrequent use of behavioral mea-
sures of helpfulness, Rivera et al. (1976) observed vol-
unteering subjects to see if they did show up for their ex-
periment. There were no effects of the independent variable;
on actual show-up rates. This suggests that the results
of those experiments which confirmed the guilt hypothesis
on the basis of measures of intentions to help must be
considered extremely limited support.
Studies reporting manipulation checks . In a study
by Heilman, Hodgson & Hornstein (1972) subjects were led to
believe that they had caused either great or slight harm:
when they sat down at a table the dropleaf collapsed,
spilling photographic slides belonging to another experi-
menter, one with whom the subject was not involved. Using
notes placed in strategic locations, ostensibly left by the
victim, subjects were informed as to the degree of importance
of the slides (great or slight harm) and whether or not a
timely report of the accident by them would allow for the
damage to be undone (rectif iable or unrectif iable harm)
.
The dependent measure was whether the subject reported the
accident or not. All subjects were alone when the
accident occurred, and they believed that they were un-
identifiable as harm-doers if they left without reporting.
In this 2x2 design, it was found that great harm-doing
produced significantly more reporting than did slight harm-
doing. When harm-doing was great, reporting occurred more
often when the harm was rectifiable than when it was not,
an interaction effect.
These results indicate the roles of severity of harm
and of the ameliorative nature of the consequences of help-
ing in determining the strength of the transgression-
helping effect. Interestingly, reporters did not also
volunteer time to the victim experimenter for another, un-
related, project. This is evidence that it was the
ameliorative consequences of reporting which was significant,
and not helping as such.
A second experiment replicated these findings and in-
cluded a clever form of manipulation check. After the
report of the accident (or after the subject had left the
building without reporting), subjects were led to believe
that the study was over and had been concerned with the
effects of accidents on memory. In the guise of a recall
test subjects were asked to report the contents of the notes
which had conveyed the manipulations. In all conditions
reporters were better able to recall the details of the
notes than were non-reporters. Finally, fifteen percent
of the total sample (evenly distributed across all condi-
tions) became a self-selected control group by virtue of
their not reading the notes at all. None of these re-
ported the accident.
It seems, then, that much as in the case of helping,
it is not harm-doing or even accidental harm-doing as such
which is sufficient to produce the usual effect; but in ad-
dition to this, the meaning for the subject of both the
harm-doing and the consequences of helping must also be
taken into account.
A study by Katz, Glass & Cohen (1973) is notable here
for the reason that the bogus teacher-learner paradigm with
simulated shock was the transgression procedure used.
Questionnaire data was also collected to check on felt
guilt and responsibility for the pain of the confederate.
It was found that guilt varied directly with the degree of
shock administered, although responsibility did not vary
with intensity. Additionally, there was no correlation
between guilt ratings and victim derogation, the major I
dependent measure of interest in this study. This is further
support for the argument that the main consequences of in-
terest should be the subsequent ameliorative actions of
the harm-doer
.
A cognitive component presumably associated
with a feeling of guilt, i.e., the knowledge that harm
was done, apparently does not serve as partial mediator
of just any post-transgression response but only of those
responses classified as ameliorative. Subjects in this
experiment could not do anything to change or make compen-
sation for the suffering of the victim and so guilt was
unrelated to the irrelevant response allowed them by the
experiment
.
Unfortunately, mean values for guilt or responsibility
were not reported by Katz, et al. , so there is no indication
of the levels of these phenomena the subjects were ex-
periencing. But a study by Brock and Buss (1964), which
used the same teacher-learner procedure, did report the mean
levels. In this study subjects were made to feel more or
less justified in their actions as teacher (i.e., shocking
the confederate) by either replicating the usual procedure
and "randomly" determining that the subject was to be the
teacher (low justification) or pretending that the subject
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was selected as the better teacher between the two on the
basis of a phoney paper-and-pencil measure of teaching
ability (high justification)
. Intensity of shock (high or
low) was also manipulated as a between subjects variable.
After the usual errors and shocks were experienced, subjects
filled out some questionnaire items which included reports
of guilt and estimates of harm done to the confederate.
Subjects in the low justification conditions reported more
guilt and estimated more harm done than did subjects in the
high justification conditions. Inspection of the mean
values for guilt are of special interest, however. The
overall mean value for guilt was below the neutral point
of the scale; that is, overall, subjects reported little
or no guilt. The difference in guilt across levels of
justification seems to be due more to the difference between
high and low shock levels, for in the high shock conditions
the means for low and high justification are separated by
only .3 of a point on a 50-point scale.
It seems, then, that where the subject of a guilt-
compliance procedure is chosen to deliver shock to another in
the setting of a legitimate experiment, randomly chosen or
not, it is unlikely that much guilt is being experienced.
Noel (1973) induced subjects to believe that they
voluntarily gave another subject false derogative feedback
about an interview they had just taken part in. Subjects'
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willingness to volunteer to make phone calls for an anti-
pollution campaign was assessed as the dependent measure.
Checks ascertained that subjects felt badly after giving
the feedback and felt they had harmed the other. Neverthe-
less, no relation was obtained between this form of trans-
gression and the measure of cooperation. It should be noted
that the request did not come from the victim or from the
experimenter or from anyone connected with either of them.
When the experiment was repeated using instead a request
to help a blind student by recording readings, again there
was no effect on compliance to this request due to the
transgression. While the behaviors requested of the subjects
in these two cases would have been helpful to someone, they
had no relation to the harm done the victim or to the sub-
ject's continuing relationship to the experimenter since
requests occurred outside of the experimenter's apparent
knowledge. The results indicate that there is something
special about being asked for help by a victim or by an ex-
perimenter. If this is so, then it is up to the guilt
theorist to explain what the presence of either of these
persons has to do with the internal state of the subject
and why a third party should not have this effect as well.
Of course, it has already been shown that there is little
or no guilt experienced in these experiments anyway.
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Finally, Wallington (1973) opera tional i zed harm-doing
by allowing subjects to lie about prior knowledge of a test
and used a number of self-report questions to assess elation,
social affection, vigor, fatigue, sadness and positive and
negative self-evaluation. None of these variables, some
of which might be expected to be highly related to guilt,
showed a relation to the lie/no lie manipulation.
A summary
. Heilman et al.'s results indicate the
importance of the meaning given to the harm done by the
subject and the essential role played by the ameliorative
nature of the consequences of helping. The results of
Katz et al. indicate that even though a subject may feel guilty
for having harmed another, this feeling does not necessarily
lead to the performance of just any subsequent action in order
to feel less guilty (i.e., victim derogation). Brock &
Buss's results cast doubt on the claim that subjects feel
guilty when engaged in shocking another as a legitimate
part of an experimental procedure. Noel's results suggest
that even if a subject feels badly about a transgression,
he or she does not necessarily help a total stranger (as
guilt theorists would argue) but only, as in most studies, the
original victim or the experimenter. Finally, Wallington's
results indicate an absence of "bad feelings" in the lie pro-
cedures used in one of the two studies whose results were
not easily reinterpreted in the previous discussion which
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focused on Table 3 (p. 21), i.e., Freedman et al. (1967).
In conclusion, the weight of evidence is decidedly against
a guilt mediation explanation and in favor of one which
incorporates the consequences of helping and the expecta-
tions of others in the situation; in this case the victim
and the experimenter
.
Hypotheses and overview
. These considerations lead directly
to the following hypotheses. First, while subjects in a
transgression procedure which is an ostensible part of a
legitimate experiment may report some discomfort at their
own actions toward a confederate, their responses to a
question specifically probing for guilt feelings will show
no guilt is experienced. Second, despite the absence of
guilt there is still some harm being done; so, the trans-
gression-compliance effect can be reproduced and will depend
on the ameliorative nature of the help requested , more help
occurring when it is ameliorative than when it is not.
These hypotheses were tested in the following experi-
ment . Subjects participated in the standard teacher- learner
situation (minus electric shock) and penalized a confederate
for errors. Subsequently, they were given the opportunity
to help either their original victim or a stranger on a
task which would aid the requester in recouping losses
incurred in the bogus learning task. The difference between
these two conditions is that with the original victim, help-
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ing would undo the harm done by the subject whereas with the
stranger it would undo harm done by someone else. As a
test of the hypothesis concerning the absence of guilt, two
conditions were included in which subjects' feelings of
responsibility for the harm done were manipulated. By
experiencing a certain degree of choice about some of the
procedures, they were made to feel more responsibility and by
absence of choice they were made to feel less.
In this 2x2 design subjects either had more or less
control over the harm done the learner, and they were asked
for help which would help recoup losses by either their
own original victim or a stranger.
CHAPTER II
AN EXPERIMENT
Method
.
Personnel. Subjects were recruited from first and
second year psychology courses on a voluntary basis and were
paid $2.50 for approximately an hour's participation. A
total of 44 subjects (11 per cell) were included in the
final analyses. Data from two other subjects were dis-
carded randomly in order to equalize the cell n*s. Con-
federates were five female undergraduates recruited from an
honors section of social psychology. Each was trained in
both confederate roles and was randomly assigned to roles
and conditions. Each was paid $2.00 for each subject they
encountered
.
Procedure
. Subjects were told that they were partici-
pating in a study which was one in a series investigating
how people feel about using highly structured teaching and
learning techniques and how these feelings influence their
subsequent performance on a related task. Care was taken to
make procedures seem plausible by describing the ostensible
practical implications of the research. Subjects were
given these instructions along with the confederate. A
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rigged random drawing was then held which determined that
the confederate would be the learner in the first task.
The subject was informed that he or she would be the teacher.
The experimenter then asked the confederate-learner if she
would agree to submit to a procedure in which she could
lose some of her money, the $2.50 which she had been promised
for participation as a subject. She paused and then
agreed. The experimenter then asked both subject and con-
federate for their consent to participate in the study as it
had thus been described. Subjects expected that after the
first task in which they were teachers, the two of them would
be given an additional task which would be worked on in-
dependently by the subject and the confederate. Subjects
therefore expected no further procedural interaction with
the confederate once the first learning task was completed.
In general, the task involved a 20 trial anagrams
solving procedure. The teacher-subject was to present each
of 20 five-letter anagrams to the confederate-learner one
at a time. The subject was to time the confederate each
trial and allow her 20 seconds for an anagram's solution.
Subjects kept a record of the procedures and penalized the
confederate for errors by removing dimes for errors from
her pay. Variations in this occurred depending on the
Choice or No Choice conditions.
Choice conditions. The subject was presented with
a list of 100 anagrams and was told to select 20 for the
learner to solve. Subjects were told that the anagrams
on the list were randomly mixed in terms of their diffi-
culty (which was true) and that they were to use their own
judgement as to which ones to use. Subjects then had the
procedures described to them and were told that when the
learner failed to solve an anagram within the time limit,
that was to be considered an error and the subject should
decide whether or not to remove a dime from the learner's
pay for that error. Again, subjects were given no guidance
as to how to decide about removing a dime, but they were
told that this was their only means of influencing the
learner's performance. After the subject had selected the
20 anagrams the learning trials began and the confederate
always made 10 errors. The subject chose freely at each
error whether to penalize the confederate or not.
No Choice conditions
. Subjects were simply given 20
anagram cards and were instructed to use these for the
learning task. Additionally, they were instructed to
penalize each error made by the learner by removing a dime
from her pay. Subjects in these conditions were yoked to
subjects in the Choice conditions in terms of the number of
dimes removed by them. Once a Choice subject had been run,
the number of dimes freely removed by him or her was deter-
mined to be the number of errors to be made by the yoked
confederate in the next No Choice condition (instead of the
standard 10 errors made by all confederates in Choice
conditions). If subject S-l in the Choice condition penal-
ized 7 out of the standard 10 errors, then subject S-2 in
the No Choice condition experienced a learner who made 7 errors
out of the 20 trials. These 7 errors would, due to the in-
structions, be automatically penalized by the subject.
All other procedures were kept the same for all sub-
jects except for those specifically mentioned above. Once
the experimenter had given the instructions for the anagrams
task, he left the room and allowed the subject to carry out
the anagrams task on his or her own. When it had been com-
pleted all subjects were given a questionnaire to fill out
(as was the confederate, in order to keep the cover story
going)
.
They were told that the experimenter needed this
information to prepare part two of the study for them. He
reminded them that part two involved working alone. Once
again the experimenter left the room. At this point the
Victim-Stranger manipulation occurred.
Victim conditions . The experimenter returned to
collect the questionnaires and announced that he would be
gone for a few minutes while preparing part two of the
study. He told the confederate that if she wished she could
work on an additional task while he was absent and if she
35
did, he would return the money she had lost in the ana-
grams procedure. The confederate agreed, and the experi-
menter left the room for 10 minutes. After 3 minutes the
confederate said to the subject (having studied the task
for that length of time), "Boy, this looks hard. Do you I
think you could help me with it?" Confederates said no more
than this to the subject and allowed the subject to do as
little or as much as she or he chose to do.
Stranger conditions
. When the experimenter returned
to collect the questionnaires he brought with him confederate
number two, whom he instructed to have a seat and to wait.
The experimenter collected the questionnaires and said that
he would be gone for a while preparing part two of the study.
The learner-confederate interrupted at this point, asking
how much longer the experiment would take. She claimed
that she could not stay for the entire experiment because she
just today remembered that she had a counseling appointment
which she could not break. The experimenter made another
appointment for her to return and complete part two of the
study and assured the subject that this did not change any-
thing for him or her, since part two was worked on indivi-
dually. When the learner-confederate had picked up her
money (minus the losses) and left, the experimenter turned
to the second confederate.
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The stranger-confederate reminded him that she was
there in order to regain the money she had lost in a pre-
vious anagrams session. She reminded him that he had
offered her this opportunity when she had lost her money.
The experimenter acted as though he now remembered, gave her
the task and left, saying that he had to look up how much
she had lost and also telling the subject that he would
return with part two shortly. After 3 minutes, the stranger-
confederate made the same request as the one made by the
learner-confederate in the Victim conditions.
In all conditions, the task involved making up ana-
grams according to a rigid procedure which was described on
a sheet of instructions. First, a six-letter word was to be
looked up in a dictionary. Then its frequency was to be
found in Thorndike & Lorge 1 s Teacher's Word Book of 30,000
Words (1944)
.
Finally, as the anagram was being created, the
frequency of each pair of letters was to be checked in Under-
wood & Schulz's Meaningfulness and Verbal Learning (1960,
appendix D) . The words and the bi-grams had to meet a
maximum frequency criterion, otherwise the confederate was to
start over again. The instructions asked that as many as
possible be done. In all conditions, after 10 minutes of
the experimenter's absence had elapsed, he returned, the
confederate left, and the subject was extensively debriefed.
All deceptions were revealed at this time.
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Questionnaire and the dependent measure
. Seven-point
scales were used to assess subjects' feelings of choice,
evaluations of the experience, and responsibility for the
learner's outcome. 1 Choice 3 (3 questions): Did your
own role in the anagrams portion of this experiment provide
you with any choice which seemed acceptably good to you? To
what extent did you, in your role, experience a meaningful
choice about what you would do as teacher? To what extent
do you feel your decisions as teacher reflect on your own
personal assessment of the overall situation? Evaluation
(3 questions)
:
How attractive did you find the prospect of
selecting the anagrams to be worked on? (Choice conditions
only.) How attractive did you find the prospect of removing
a dime for an error? Rate how attractive or unattractive
you think the learner views his/her outcome in the anagrams
procedure. Responsibility (5 questions): How strongly are
you associated with the events which brought about the
learner's outcome-? How instrumental were you in bringing
about the learner's outcome? How foreseeable was the learn-
er's outcome to you? How much did you intend to bring about
the learner's outcome? How justified was your action related
to the learner's outcome? In addition, subjects indicated a
2
self evaluation consisting of 4 bi-polar scales: Satisfied
. . . unsatisfied. Responsible . . . not responsible.
Blameworthy . . . not blameworthy. Guilty . . . not guilty.
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When the confederate who made the request left the
lab she filled out a checklist which described the subject's
helping behavior. The categories of this checklist were,
"subject read the task instructions; subject gave advice,
instructions, or directions to the confederate; subject used
the task materials; subject created or wrote down anagrams."
Results
Two-by-two analyses of variance (Instructional Set:
Choice/No Choice by Person Helped: Victim/Stranger) were
conducted on the responses to each of the above questions
as well as on the measure of helping and on the number of
dimes taken by the subjects during the anagrams procedure.
Subjects on the average took away forty cents overall; there
were no significant differences between conditions for the
amount of money taken away from the learner (X = 4.05 dimes)
Thus, the yoking procedure succeeded in controlling this
variable between conditions
.
The four-point scale derived from the helped confeder-
ate's checklist description of the subject's helping be-
havior formed a Guttmann scale with a coefficient of re-
producibility of .94 and a coefficient of minimal marginal
reproducibility of .39. Analysis of variance here yielded
a main effect for the identity of the requester (the person
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helped) such that the victim was aided more than the
stranger (F = 13.573; p <.001 3 ). There was no effect
for Instructional Set, nor was there an intersction effect.
Table 4 presents the means for these results. (See Table
4. )
Subjects' estimates of the learner's attraction to
her own outcome, an indirect index of how much harm the
subjects thought they had committed, showed a main effect
for the instructions variable such that Choice subjects
*
estimated a lower evaluation by the learner of her outcome
(X = 3.1818) than did No Choice subjects (X = 4.4545; F =
8.133, £ <. 007) .
The three questions assessing choice correlated
significantly (r =+.31 to +.45, all p's <.04, two-tailed
tests)
,
and so these responses were combined to form one
overall index of the degree of experienced choice . Scores
could range from 3 (none at all) to 21 (very much) . Analysis
of variance of this index revealed a trend toward a main
effect for Instructions (F = 3.669, p <.06) such that Choice
subjects reported more choice (X = 13.7273) than did No
— 4Choice subjects (X = 11.2273).
Degree of association was highly correlated with de-
gree of instrumentality (r = +.66, p <.001)^ and with degee
of responsibility (r = +.32, £ <.03); instrumentality was in
turn correlated with foreseeabili ty (r = +.37, p <.01).
Table 4
Mean level of helping in each condition and the
marginals. Data are scaled 1 to 4 with a higher
number indicating more helping. Cell n = 11.
Person Helped
Instructional
Set
Victim Stranger
Choice 3.1818 2.0000 2.5909
No Choice 3 . 2727 1.6364 2.4545
3.2272 1.8182
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These scores were combined into a single overall index
of felt responsibility which could range from 4 (none at
all) to 28 (a high degree). Analysis of variance revealed
a main effect for instructions (F = 4 . 950
, p_ <.03) such
that Choice subjects reported feeling more responsible
for the learner's outcome (X = 17.8636) than did No Choice
subjects (X = 14.5909). No other significant main effects,
nor any interaction effects, were revealed by the analysis
of variance on any other variable.
Table 5 presents the Pearson r correlation coeffi-
cient matrix for all subjects' responses on selected de-
pendent measures. Intercorrelations among the questionnaire
items assessing choice and those assessing responsibility
have already been discussed. The two overall indices for
these variables have been included in the matrix of Table 5.
It should be noted that helping did not significantly
correlate with any of the variables.
The number of dimes taken and, more especially, the
estimate of the learner's attraction to or liking for her
outcome can be viewed as an estimate of the degree of harm
inflicted on the learner in the subject's view. As can be
seen from Table 5, the former (dimes) was negatively related
to how justified the subject felt (r =+.32, p <.04) and
to reported satisfaction (r = -.37, p <.01). Thus, the more
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dimes the subject took, the less justified and satisfied
he or she felt. The estimation of the learner's attraction
to her outcome was positively related to satisfaction
(r = +.36, p <.02), and negatively related to blame-
worthiness (r =
-.31, p <.04), guilt (r =
-.44, p <.003),
and responsibility (r =
-.31, p <. 0 2). Thus, the more
damage that was thought to have been caused, the more
responsible, blameworthy and guilty, and the less satis-
fied the subject felt. Finally, choice was positively re-
lated to intentionality (r = +.35, p <.02), which suggests
that subjects inferred their own intention to cause the
learner's outcome from the magnitude of the damage done
and from their instructionally induced perceptions of
choice
.
Discussion
The first hypothesis predicted that while subjects
may report mild discomfort after the anagrams procedure,
they would report no guilt feelings. This was confirmed.
Overall, subjects reported themselves to be "not blame-
worthy" (X = 2.8864) and "not guilty" (X = 3.0000) despite
the fact that they did feel slightly responsible for the
learner's outcome (X = 4.7045) which they imagined the
learner did not like (X = 2.2045).
Table 5
Pearson r correlation coefficients for
selected variables. All tests of significance
are 2-tailed. For all r's, df = 42 pairs.
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It may be concluded that a simple guilt explanation
is heavily overstated when it is applied to post-trans-
gression compliance where the transgression is a legitimate
part of an experimental procedure. This conclusion is
further supported by the observation that while the Choice-
No Choice manipulation succeeded in creating expected
differences in degree of choice and responsibility ex-
perienced, as well as in estimates of the learner's liking for
her outcome, guilt and blameworthiness were not so affected.
These procedures were included as a direct test of the guilt
hypothesis, and while they clearly had an effect on some
aspects of the subject's experience, they did not produce
the effects required by a strict guilt mediation explanation.
This includes, but should not be thought of as limited to,
the lack of a main effect for helping due to the manipulation
of the choice instructions. It is only fair to add, however,
that there was a tendency for helping and guilt to be posi-
tively related (r = +.27, p <.08).
A limitation to the inferential value of the guilt
and blameworthiness data must be mentioned. These data are,
in one sense, manipulation checks. As such, they show that
the present operations failed to create the appropriate
internal feeling-states which would provide an adequate
test of the guilt hypothesis. Therefore, the first hy-
pothesis could be seen as untested and unconfirmed.
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Two objections can be raised concerning this criti-
cism. First, the present experiment represents the first
attempt to directly assess the presence of guilt feelings
in the transgression-compliance situation. if this ex-
periment failed to create the appropriate state, then all
others like it, namely, all those in which a subject's harm
doing is part of a legitimate experiment, have probably failed
to do so, as well. This still leaves open the question of
guilt's presence in the lie-telling and the accidental
damage situations, however (e.g., Freedman, et al .
, #1,
1967; Regan, Williams & Sparling, 1972). Further study
would be required before it could be concluded that guilt
is an important mediating variable in these situations.
Second, manipulation checks are generally thought of
as incidental data which assess subjects' ability to recog-
nize or recall the objective events which transpire in an
experimental procedure. These subject reports are for the
most part veridical (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, pp. 135-
143)
.
The present assessments of guilt and blameworthiness
asked for a report on their feelings which resulted from
those objective events. Therefore, the inference made here,
that little or no guilt was experienced, is an inference
about psychological states based not on manipulation checks
but on subjects' own inferences about their own states.
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The second hypothesis predicted that despite the
absence of guilt feelings and the lack of relation between
guilt and helping, helping would occur as a function of
the ameliorative nature of its consequences. The Victim-
Stranger conditions were included in order to test this
hypothesis. The results support this interpretation. Sub-
jects aided the original victim much more than they did the
stranger, and it should be noted that the requested aid
required the same activity of all subjects and would have
had the same effect for the recipients. The difference is
due, then, to the fact that in the Victim conditions, subjects
were undoing the harm they themselves had caused, whereas
in the Stranger conditions they were not, but were only undoing
harm caused by someone else.
Important to note here is the absence of a direct check
on whether subjects actually perceived their respective situ-
ations in these ways. This does not carry the same force,
however, as the similar lack with respect to checks on guilt
in prior studies. A subject's inferences about his feelings
of guilt and about the ameliorative consequences of helping
differ in two ways. The locus of one is internal and the
other's is external. The inference of guilt is the identi-
fication of a response to a situation and the inference of
ameliorative consequences is the recognition of the stimulus
situation itself. A further study of this problem could be
done, using subjects who read scenario descriptions of the
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different conditions. If these subjects could recognize
the objective difference between the Victim and Stranger
conditions with respect to their consequences for ameliora-
tion, then further support for hypothesis two would be
provided. It is less certain, however, that a similar
approach could be used with respect to guilt since it is
likely that the identification of this internal response
requires experiencing the events as the subjects in the
behavioral study did. Whether scenario reading subjects
could replicate behavioral subjects' responses about guilt
or not, these results would not help to ascertain the
presence of the behavioral subjects' responses of guilt
to the stimulus situations described by the legitimate
transgression and the ameliorative consequences of helping.
It could be argued that a subject's feeling of
embarrassment (Apsler, 1975), being confounded with the
ameliorative nature of the consequences of helping in the
present operations, is what caused the results. That is,
embarrassed subjects who are confronted with their original
victim will be more likely to help in order to remove
their shame or embarrassment in the victim's eyes. It is
unfortunate that no questions about embarrassment or shame
were asked which would provide data which directly addresses
this objection. Nevertheless, subjects overall reported
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feeling satisfied (X = 5.0000) and this feeling seems
somewhat antithetical to feelings of embarrassment.
Therefore, while not conclusive, the available evidence
seems not to support this objection.
It is fairly clear that explanations of the trans-
gression-compliance phenomenon based solely on such con-
cepts as guilt, "negative state relief" (e.g., Cialdini,
Darby & Vincent, 1973), self-esteem maintenance (McMillan,
1971)
,
and general arousal mediated by responsibility
(Geer & Jarmecky, 1973) would not predict the present re-
sults on helping due to the ameliorative nature of the
consequences. The results do appear, however, to be con-
sistent with Brock's (1969) hypothesis of a need for
consistency of fate control over another. In this analysis
the helpful or harmful features of the actions performed
are not as important as the fact that the present subjects
in the Victim conditions were acting on a need to maintain
equivalent fate control over the same target person. But
this position ignores the evidence that all subjects (and
Choice subjects more than the others) do recognize a harm-
ful effect on the learner and do feel responsible for it.
The consistency explanation does not delve deeply enough
into the subject's own experience.
The present study demonstrates that the more finely
the experience of a subject is investigated, the more pre-
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cise a prediction of helping after transgression can be
made. The identity of the requester, and consequently
who's harm doing is to be undone, will determine whether
much helping will occur in spite of the possible strength
of the covert elements.
A second explanation consistent with the results is
that subjects in the Victim conditions have established
and have been forced to maintain a minimal relationship
with their partners. Subjects in the Stranger conditions,
however, are able in a sense, to "start from zero" with
their new partners. This idea predicts greater subsequent
involvement with the original partner than with the stranger
on almost any dimension which is reasonably appropriate or
normative. Since the only opportunity for subsequent in-
volvement in the present study is the request for help,
the results on this variable are only spuriously related to
the prior transgression and the ameliorative consequences
of helping. Control conditions in which subjects interact
with their partners without taking money away would have been
useful for addressing this alternate explanation. The es-
tablishment of such a minimal relationship during the
anagrams task would lead to a pattern of results between
a same-partner and a different-partner control group which
would be identical to the present results.
50
Unfortunately, these data are not available. if, in
a further study, subjects' levels of helping in the control
conditions are equivalent and in turn are equavalent to the
help given in the Stranger conditions, then this alternative
explanation will have been disconf irmed
, and the presnet
hypothesis further supported.
Two important results of the present paper are to
describe the degree to which the literature on transgression
compliance lacks internal validity, and to clarify what
some overlooked sources of variation are in the typical
procedures. Yet how generalizable
,
' how ecologically valid,
are these research results? The most striking inadequacy
of this whole line of research (the present experiment
included) is that it sheds little light on the nature of
these phenomena in established relationships. All subjects,
confederates, and experimenters have been complete strangers
to one another in all the reports to date. If we are
interested in these processes because they shed light on
mechanisms of socialization and social cohesion, then they
must be investigated among pairs and groups of people
who are already in relationships with one another; whether
these relationships be personal, institutional, or a com-
bination of these. For it is rare outside the laboratory
that strangers come into contact for a long enough time to
allow processes described here to be initiated or affected;
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and people mostly interact with people they already know.
Given the institutional embeddedness of the experimenter-
subject and the subject-subject relationships, it seems
that the more immediate steps along this line could be
taken by looking at people in other kinds of institutional
relationships; in the classroom, the workplace, or
perhaps in the helping professions.
Research on the transgression-compliance effect has
diminished in the last six to eight years after a short peak
of interest. Perhaps this is partly due to a feeling that
the phenomenon had been adequately established and accounted
for. Certainly, another reason is the general switch to
research on social perception and judgement in general.
This paper has attempted to show that what was assumed to
occur in the research reviewed is only part of the story.
In addition it is one step in the direction of bringing
behavior, in this case post-transgression behavior, back to
social perception research. The elements for this desirable
union are present: responsibility and choice inferences,
costs and benefits of action; it is a small step to move
from an actor's own post- transgression acts to those of
observers or victims.
Some interesting questions for future research along
these lines concern the perceptions and attributions of
third-party observers to the transgression-compliance
situation. For example, is post-transgression helping
seen as an "admission of guilt"? if so, what effect will
this have on observers' reactions to the actor? Will an
attempt to ameliorate harm done in turn serve to ameliorate
an observer's assignment of blame or punishment? Or will
post-transgression helping only be seen as a confession?
Additionally, what is the transgressor's "implicit
attribution theory" about what observers will infer about
him and how might this affect his own post-transgression
responses?
The closing of the "attribution loop," i.e., from
actor to observer and back to the actor again, via the
investigation of an actor's implicit theories of how others
will view his actions, is a tantalizing follow-up to the
present integration of the transgression-compliance
literature. It is one that seems an appropriate extension
of the attribution literature as a whole.
FOOTNOTES
For these questions, 1 represents no amount of theentity described, 7 represents an extremely hiqh
amount, and 4 represents a neutral point.
The four bi-polar scales ranged from +3 to -3.
For all F's, df_ = 1, 40.
In the separate analyses of variance for each of thethree questions assessing choice, all F's <1 exceptfor two. These were the F's for instructional set(choice/no choice) on the "good choice" question (F3.617, p <.064) and on the "personal assessment" ~
question (F = 1.820, p <.185).
For all r's, df = 42.
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